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Summary 
 
 
Recent economic survey suggests that Chinese merger and acquisition (M&A) activities increase 
significantly in both domestic and cross-border market. Rich literature has discussed the wealth creation 
of M&As announcement which explain the economic reasons behind the boom of the Chinese market 
using acquiring firms’ data. However, little research has focused on Chinese takeover targets due to 
limited availability of datasets despite its importance (Shanmin and Chen Yugang, 2002; Chi et al., 
2011).  
Fortunately, with the well-computerized data set from Standard and Poor's Capital IQ in recent 
years, it is possible to examine the shareholder’s wealth of Chinese takeover targets from a large sample 
as well as its fundamental determinants. By merging Capital IQ M&As data and CSMAR stock data, I 
receive a sample of 683 deals from 2010 to 2015 that have adequate information to conduct event study 
and cross-sectional analysis.  Consistent with PWC China report in 2015, the sample (describe in details 
in Section 3) shows a significant growth in the number of deals and the deal volume of M&A activities 
across years. 
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By utilizing a large and recent data set collected from 2010-2015, this thesis answers the two questions 
as follows. 
• Firstly, do mergers and acquisitions create returns for the shareholders of Chinese target firms? 
• Secondly, what are the determinants of takeover returns for the shareholders of Chinese target 
firms? 
Event study shows that on average, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) three days around the 
announcement date are 2%. It means that the shareholders of Chinese targets gain positive returns during 
the study period 2010-2015. Especially, in 2015, Chinese takeover targets gain such positive CARs of 
4.1% on average compared to the other years. In addition, a summary of CARs across industries shows 
that target shareholders of the diversified real estate activities industry receive the highest average CARs 
of 7.5% from 2010 to 2015, which is higher than CARs observed in any industry.  
Cross-sectional analysis of CARs for the sample of 683 targets shows that cash payment and 
market-to-book ratio are significant determinants. Particularly, market-to-book ratio increases by 1, 
CARs increase 0.2%, ceteris paribus. This indicates that shareholders of Chinese targets receive more 
abnormal returns when the target firms having higher internal investment opportunities. Moreover, when 
takeover transaction is entirely financed by cash, CARs increase by 1.4%. This finding suggests that 
transactions with 100% cash offer create more wealth to the target shareholders than stock or mixed cash 
stock offers.  
Cross-sectional analysis of CARs for the sample of 382 targets having positive CARs shows that 
deal size, EBITDA, market to book ratio are significant determinants.  Empirical evidence suggests that 
1% increase of EBITDA will result in 0.126% loss in the wealth of the shareholders. It suggests that 
selling profitable targets cause harm to the shareholders. 
Deal size increases 1%, CARs increase 0.007%, statistically significantly at 10%, holding other 
factors remain constant. It means that every 1% increase in the natural logarithm of total amount paid by 
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the acquiring firm result in 0.007% increase in CARs. It is noticed that size variable is not significant in 
the whole sample of 683 acquisitions, but is significant in the group of 382 transactions which show 
positive cumulative abnormal returns. Moreover, market-to-book ratio increases 1%, CARs increase 
0.004%, statistically significant at 1% level, keeping other factors constant.  It can be explained that the 
higher the market-to-book ratio, the higher expectation the market towards the investment opportunities 
of the firm.  
This study contributes to the existing literature of mergers and acquisitions in several aspects. 
Firstly, the examination of the stock market’s reactions to M&A announcements for Chinese takeover 
targets is completed using the latest data set from Capital IQ database and CSMAR stock data. To the 
author’s knowledge, previous studies of Chinese M&As use small samples and tend to focus on returns 
of acquirers instead of targets. 
 Secondly, the study employs the linear regression method to test the determinants of the takeover 
returns of Chinese targets. In the literature review, previously existing literature of M&A’s in different 
countries is reviewed and then, through nomination, several candidates of determinants are examined to 
explain the Chinese target’s returns. Empirical analysis shows that 100% cash offer and market-to-book 
ratio significantly contribute to the takeover returns (cumulative abnormal returns) for Chinese target 
shareholders. Deal size and EBITDA are significant in the group of 382 deals sample including deals 
that have positive CARs. Specifically, deal size significantly increases CARs, while EBITDA shows a 
strong and negative relation with CARs.  
Finally, some practical applications of event study using to analyze the returns to target 
shareholders are summarized. They could be forecasting the deal’s profitability from a perspective of 
efficient market, analyzing competitor’s strategic movement, or even providing some guidelines to 
speculators. Implications of the findings from perspectives of target’s managers and individual investors 
are also shared. 
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Abstract 
This thesis examines takeover returns to the shareholders of Chinese targets during a period of three 
days around the announcement date of acquisition transactions. Traditional event study methodology is 
used to measure the target returns (i.e., cumulative abnormal returns). It also examines the fundamental 
determinants of takeover returns. By utilizing the latest sample of 683 M&A transactions from 2010 to 
2015, the study shows that the target shareholders receive positive abnormal returns of 2% on average 
over a short period of three days around the announcement date, (-1, +1). Summary statistics also 
indicate that the takeover returns in the diversified real estate activities industry are highest compared to 
other industries. Linear regression analysis suggests that cash is a significant determinant of the wealth 
of target shareholders. Specifically, when takeover transaction is entirely financed by cash, CARs 
increase by 1.4%. This finding is strongly consistent with the tax hypothesis and the information effect 
hypothesis. Moreover, market-to-book ratio is also documented as a significant determinant to the 
wealth of shareholders of Chinese target firms. Particularly, market-to-book ratio increases by one, 
CARs increase 0.2%, holding all other factors constant.  
KEY WORDS: Chinese targets; Cumulative abnormal returns; Determinants.  
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1. Introduction 
It is well-known that mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are the largest and most important corporate 
investment which attracts huge attention of researchers and practitioners around the world. These events 
provide a unique window to examine the effect of the strategic decision that the acquirer or the target has 
made in both short-term and long-term. With the strong theoretical foundation and developed 
econometric methods over past decades, studies related to the wealth and performance impact of M&A 
announcement in the U.S. market are extensively developed; however, it is limited in China due to data 
availability.  
There is a huge need for more comprehensive research on examining the wealth effect of M&As on 
Chinese targets using large samples. It is simply because the economic environment in China is 
significantly different from that in the U.S., and the Chinese M&As market is still developing. 
Furthermore, China is the second biggest economy in the world and a larger number of oversea investors 
are having interests in understanding the characteristics and effect of domestic Chinese acquisitions. 
Therefore, there is a huge demand for more detailed analysis using well-developed theories and U.S. and 
latest Chinese data to understand the Chinese M&A market as well as the difference between M&As in 
the developing and developed market.  
China M&A market report of CCMAR in 2015 states that excess capacity problems, policies 
restriction, economic structure reform, environmental restrictions are representative reasons for the 
slowing growth of the Chinese economy. And this economic situation makes it more difficult for 
Chinese firms to grow up internally. However, it brings great opportunities for mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) activities where firms can grow externally through M&As. A statistical summary of PWC China 
in 2015 also shows that the Chinese M&A market has created a new historical record in 2015. There are 
over 114 deals that have transaction value of more than one billion U.S. dollars.  The number of all kinds 
of deals (including Inbound M&A, Outbound M&A, domestic M&A, cross-border M&A) has increased 
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37%, from 6898 deals in 2014 to 9420 deals in 2015. And the total amount of deal value increased 84%, 
reaching 734 billion dollars in 2015. 
Chinese M&A market is experiencing dramatic growth because companies are searching for 
opportunities to maintain competitiveness in this dynamic global business environment as well as 
opportunities to create more value through merger synergies such as business process optimisation, 
revenue increasing, cost reduction and so on. The wealth effects of M&As indicate changes in the wealth 
of shareholders which are measured as the changes in the stock price of the target firms. And it is the 
greatest concern for the shareholders when deciding to complete a transaction.  
There are a lot of studies examining the wealth effects of acquisition announcements using U.S. 
stock data (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008; Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 2001; Phalippou, Xu, & Zhao, 2015). However, despite the rapid growing in both number of 
transactions and volume in recent years, relative little research has been conducted in Chinese M&A 
market because of limited availability of databases on M&A transactions compared to that in U.S. M&A 
market. (Shanmin & Chen Yugang, 2002; Chi et al., 2011).  More specifically, previous researchers tend 
to study the wealth effects of the acquirer’s shareholders instead of the target’s. Jianyu, José ,Chu, 
(2009) study only wealth effects on shareholders of bidding firms because their sample of 1477 
transactions includes only around one hundred listed target firms. And research related to Chinese 
targets normally uses small samples of less than one hundred transactions. Fortunately, with the well-
computerized data set from Standard and Poor's Capital IQ in recent years, it is possible to examine the 
shareholder’s wealth of Chinese takeover targets from a large sample as well as its fundamental 
determinants.   
To the author’s knowledge, there are many papers investigating the performance of Chinese 
bidding firms. Agyenim et al. (2008) examine a sample of 27 Chinese cross-border transactions, which 
takes place in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange during the period 2000-2004. They find that 
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cross-border transaction is created to promote entering new markets and obtaining foreign advanced 
technologies. As a result, it increases the wealth of the shareholders of Chinese acquirers. Jing Chi, Qian 
Sun, Martin Young, (2011) use a large sample of 1148 Chinese M&A transactions from 1998 to 2003 
and find that Chinese acquirers only gain positive abnormal returns within a short period of six months 
around the announcement date; however, the wealth effects vanish in the long run. They also employ 
cross-sectional analysis of acquirer returns and document that political advantages have a positive effect 
on the performance of acquiring firms while cash payment and regulation development show a negative 
influence.  
This thesis adopts a similar methodology as Jing Chi, Qian Sun, Martin Young, (2011), but it 
investigates the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the shareholders of Chinese listed targets during 
a short-run period of three days around the M&A announcement date, then using a cross-sectional 
regression to find out determinants of takeover target’s returns. It is noticed that the study’s data that is 
collected from S&P Capital IQ is different from the sample of Jing Chi, Qian Sun, Martin Young, (2011) 
that is obtained only from China Shenzhen GTA (Guo Tai An) Information Technology Co., Ltd. Also, 
in this study, only transactions of listed takeover targets that have stock information to conduct event 
study are examined rather than acquisitions of listed acquirers as in Jing Chi et al. (2011). Additionally, 
it is observed that there are only 19 listed targets over 1148 transactions in Jing Chi et al. (2011), while 
in this study the sample to be analysed contains 683 listed Chinese targets.  
By utilizing a large and recent data set from 2010-2015, this thesis answers two questions as 
follows. 
• Firstly, do M&As create abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese target firms?  
• Secondly, what are the determinants of takeover returns for the shareholders of Chinese 
target firms? 
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Although, the vast majority of domestic or cross-border transactions in China  are acquisitions of 
unlisted targets, this study concentrates on the domestic transactions and acquisitions of listed targets 
only. In addition, only targets that are traded on mainland China's Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges are selected in the dataset.  
Details of M&A transactions are collected from S&P Capital IQ database following screening 
criterial: both targets and acquirers are Chinese firms; target are listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock 
Exchanges; announcement date are between 1/1/2010 and 31/12/2015; and transactions status is closed. 
Merging M&A dataset and China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) result in a 
sample of 683 deals which have available information to conduct event study, and deal and target 
characteristics including cash offer, market to book ratio, transaction size, debt ratio, and EBITDA ratio. 
The study finds that on average, M&As create average 2% abnormal returns for the shareholders of 
Chinese targets three days around the announcement date during the period 2010-2015. It means that 
shareholders of Chinese targets receive positive returns during the announcement date. Especially, in 
2015 Chinese targets gain large positive CARs of 4.1% compared to the other years. In addition, a 
summary of CARs across industry showing that target shareholders of the diversified real estate 
activities industry receive the highest average CARs of 7.5% compared to other industries. There are 
alternative explanations for the positive wealth gain of the target’s shareholders. Firstly, it may partially 
reflect the synergistic value that the acquirer expects to receive through combining the two firms.  
Secondly, it may be the realisation by stock market investors that the target’s stock price is previously 
undervalued, and the M&A announcement make them re-evaluate the target’s stock price. Thirdly, the 
takeover returns can be results of a restructuring of the target as a separate operational entity which may 
still share managerial, financial and strategic synergies with the acquirer. Lastly, the wealth gain of the 
target shareholders may be because of the acquirer’s overpayment. 
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Cross-sectional analysis of shareholders’ wealth of Chinese targets around the announcement date 
shows that cash payment and market-to-book ratio are significant determinants of CARs. Particularly, 
when market-to-book ratio increases by one, CARs increase 0.2%, holding other factors constant. This 
indicates that shareholders of Chinese targets receive more returns when the target firms have higher 
internal investment opportunities. Moreover, when the takeover transaction is entirely financed by cash, 
CARs increase 1.4%. This result shows that transactions with 100% cash offer create more wealth to the 
target shareholders than stock or mixed cash and stock offers do. 
This study contributes to the existing literature of merger and acquisition in several aspects. Firstly, 
the examination of the stock market’s reactions to M&A announcements of Chinese takeover targets is 
completed using the latest data set from Standard and Poor's Capital IQ database and The China Stock 
Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database. To the author’s knowledge, previous studies of 
Chinese M&As use small samples and tend to focus on returns of the acquirer’s instead of the target’s. 
Secondly, the study employs the cross-sectional regression method to test the determinants of takeover 
returns of Chinese listed targets. Previous literature of M&A research in different countries is reviewed 
and then, through nomination, several candidates for the determinants of takeover returns are selected 
and then tested with Chinese M&A data. Through the utilization of the linear regression method with 
Chinese M&A data and stock data, the study finds that 100% cash offer and market-to-book ratio 
significantly contribute to the takeover returns (cumulative abnormal returns) for Chinese listed target 
shareholders. Deal size and EBITDA are significant in the sample of 382 acquisitions which creates 
positive CARs. 
Finally, some practical applications of event study used to analyze the returns to target shareholders 
are summarized. They could be forecasting the deal’s profitability from a perspective of efficient capital 
market, analyzing competitor’s strategic movements, or even providing some guidelines to speculators. 
Implications of the findings from perspectives of target’s managers and individual investors are also 
shared. 
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This study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the overview of empirical literatures on 
takeover returns for Chinese target shareholders and discusses factors which have been hypothesized to 
affect shareholders’ wealth. Section 3 describes data selection and methodologies employed in this study. 
Section 4 addresses the empirical results from cross-sectional analysis and explains the effects of 
determinants on shareholders’ wealth. Section 5 presents the conclusions and compares them with 
expected results in the empirical literatures. In addition, the implications and the acknowledgments of 
the study are also presented.  
2. Empirical literature 
2.1  Takeover returns for Chinese target firms 
Most of previous empirical studies in different countries show that M&As create significant wealth 
for shareholders of target firms. Campa and Hernando （2004）investigate the wealth effects of M&As on 
shareholders of firms in the European Union from 1998 to 2000, and find that only shareholders of 
targets receive significantly positive abnormal returns of 9% during the event window. Jensen and 
Ruback （1983）find that shareholders of target firms received 30% of abnormal returns around the M&A 
announcement date and Jarrell & Poulsen (1989) state  that M&As result in significant positive abnormal 
returns to shareholders of target firms by analysing U.S. data between 1963-1986 in the event window of 
-20 days to +10 days. Asquith, Kim (1982) state that shareholders of target firms obtain positive 
abnormal returns while acquiring firms do not create wealth for shareholders.  
However, in case of Asia market, Cheung and Mun (2009) examine a sample in which 203 listed 
targets and 455 private targets from 2000 to 2007 are included. They find that negative average 
abnormal returns are obtained surrounding the M&A announcement period for shareholders of targets in 
Asia market. Priyanka Shah and Parvinder Arora (2014) study a sample comprising 37 M&A 
announcements where both bidders and targets are listed companies. They analyse the effects of M&As 
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on target firms and find that shareholders of target firms in Asia market receive significant positive 
abnormal returns across all event windows including (-2, +2) days, (-5, +5) days, (-7, +7) days, (-10, 
+10) days. In other words, there are conflicting results about whether M&As in Asia market create 
wealth for shareholders of targets.  In terms of Chinese market, Li and Yugang (2002) state that because 
of state equity ownership and lack of competitors, M&As create significant abnormal returns to 
shareholders of acquiring firms by studying a sample comprising 196 Chinese bidding firms, but M&As 
do not significantly bring wealth to shareholders of target firms by examining a small sample which 
includes 153 Chinese targets from 1990 to 2000.  
In addition to the study of Li and Yugang (2002), Tuan et al. (2007) examine the takeover returns 
of Chinese targets when studying the profitability of merger arbitrage strategies. They use a small 
sample of 22 tender offers during the period 2002-2006. They find a positive return during the period (-
30,0) while targets receive significantly negative returns from the day 0 to the resolution day. They, 
however, find no significant effect of mandatory tender offer events on target’s stock price. Wan, Tang, 
and Cai (2016) examine 149 target companies around the M&A announcement date from 2002 to 2015, 
and find that shareholders of the targets receive significantly negative abnormal returns in the short run.  
Also, studies about M&As on the wealth effect of shareholders of Chinese targets are under-
developed compared to studies in other developed countries, such as in U.S. or UK.  Li and Yugang 
(2002) state that most of results about wealth effects are based on UK and U.S. data while demonstrative 
researches about wealth effect of Chinese listed companies are still at the beginning point. Chi et al. 
(2011) add that studies about Chinese M&As are under-developed and sample size is very small so far.  
Taking advantages of S&P Capital IQ database, the study tries to provide large sample evidence on 
the returns to the shareholders of Chinese listed targets during the recent period 2010-2015. The study 
also employs cross-sectional regression method to identify the determinants of target’s returns.   
2.2  Determinants of takeover returns for Chinese target firms 
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This section discusses several candidates for the determinants of returns to target’ shareholders that 
are documented in previous literature. Previous studies state that targets with cash offers earn a 
significantly higher returns compared with those involved in stock transactions. There are two 
alternative hypotheses associated with cash payment. One is taxes hypothesis. Wansley et al. (1983) and 
Yen-sheng and Ralph (1987) argue that if targets shareholders sell their shares in stock exchange offers, 
they can delay the tax payment for capital gains until they sell bidding firm’s shares. However, they have 
to pay capital gain taxes immediately if they receive cash offers. Hence, target shareholders expect 
higher returns to compensate their immediate taxes expenditures in cash offers. The other hypothesis is 
information effect hypothesis. Fishman (1989) argues that the cash offer is a signal of a high valuation of 
the target, aiming at preventing potential competitors. Elazar and Narayanan (1990) add that cash offers 
refer to good news about potential synergy, resulting in higher returns to shareholders of targets 
compared to that of stock offers. From the literatures about cash offers, the study controls for cash offer 
as one of the determinant of Chinese takeover returns for target shareholders. 
Following previous literature, the study also controls for the market-to-book ratio. Market-to-book 
ratio is measured as the firm value divided by its book value. The market value of firms is the total value 
of market capitalization and book value of liabilities. Kallapur (1999) and Goyal (2000) state that 
market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q are the most effective measures of investment opportunities of a 
firm. However, Using Tobin’s Q is difficult because market value of liabilities is difficult to measure 
and that most empirical studies such as Perfect, Wiles (1994) states that Tobin’s Q is highly correlated 
with market-to-book ratio. Therefore, the assumption is made that the market value and the book value 
of a firm's liabilities are equivalent. And researchers use market-to-book ratio to measure the investment 
opportunities of a firm. Therefore, the study uses market-to-book ratio rather than Tobin’s Q to reflect 
the growth opportunities and internal investment opportunities of takeover targets.  
In terms of investment opportunities, bidders who lack of valuable investment opportunities tend to 
seek external investment opportunities by initiating mergers and acquisitions to achieve future growth. 
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However, managements of target firms having high internal investment opportunities may tend to do 
more investments which are possibly unprofitable investments instead of paying dividends back to their 
shareholders. Therefore, M&As force target firms to make better use of their cash flow and thus benefit 
their shareholders. In conclusion, high market-to-book ratio reflects good news to shareholders of target 
firms, and they expect to receive high returns through M&As. 
Mark and Robert (1981) and Hatem (2005) state that an increase in the debt negatively affects stock 
prices, which results in negative effects on shareholder’s wealth. Therefore, the study controls for the 
debt ratio that is a measure of the proportion of a firm’s assets that are financed by debt. In brief, it is 
equal to the ratio of total debt to total asset. The debt ratio also shows the safety of the company. A high 
debt ratio equal to one means that the firm is a highly leverage firm and that total liabilities of the firm 
are equal to total assets of the firm. In other words, the company has to sell off all of its assets in order to 
pay off its liabilities. A lower debt ratio, less than 0.5, shows that the company has twice as many assets 
as liabilities. It shows the company is relatively safe. 
The study also controls for the deal size and profitability of the target. Transaction value is 
described as the total amount paid by the acquiring firm. Deal size denoted as the natural logarithm of 
the transaction value.  EBITDA ratio that is denoted as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortization divided by total assets is measured. The ratio measures the amount of EBITDA profit 
generated on the company’s total assets and provides a point of comparison to determine if the firm is 
using its assets more or less effectively than it had previously. 
The EBITDA ratio implies that the more profitable the company, the more returns the shareholders 
would be rewarded. In other words, the more profitable the target firm is, the less expected returns for 
shareholders of Chinese targets if selling their shares to the acquirer compared with keeping them and 
earning high returns in the future. Similarly, the less profitable it is, the more expected abnormal returns 
target shareholders would receive if selling their shares to the acquirer.  
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In conclusion, previous literatures from different countries suggest that cash offer, deal size, market 
to book ratio, EBITDA ratio, debt ratio are possible determinants that influence takeover returns of 
shareholders of target firms. 
2.3  Hypotheses 
The study focuses on testing the following three hypotheses using takeover returns to Chinese listed 
targets around the M&A announcement date: 
Hypothesis 1: M&As create positive abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese listed target 
firms.  
Hypothesis 2: Cash offer positively affect the takeover returns of shareholders of Chinese listed 
target firms. 
Hypothesis 3: Market to book ratio has a positive effect to the takeover returns of shareholders of 
Chinese listed target firms.  
3. Data Methodology and Sample Statistics 
3.1 Data description and sample selection 
Transaction details are collected from S&P Capital IQ database in the study. The S&P Capital IQ 
database is a premier financial database. It covers more than 79,000 public companies and also 700,000 
private firms over more than 130 countries.  Through well utilizing the database, we can obtain wide-
ranging global market analysis such as Mergers and acquisitions analysis, financial statement analysis, 
financial modelling and so on. All of these features combine to create a robust learning platform that 
empowers financial professionals to achieve sound investment decision-makings.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of total deal number by years of announcement dates of Chinese mergers and 
acquisitions between 2010 to 2015. The figure summarizes the number of deals that the target is Chinese 
firm announced each year in Chinese M&A market. Deal information is collected from S&P Capital IQ 
database. In this study, by ‘bidding firm’, ‘bidder’ I mean the firm initiating the M&A transaction; the object 
of a transaction is the ‘target’ firm. 
 
 
To get the complete data for Chinese takeover listed targets, the following screening criteria are 
applied: (1) Selecting M&As in transaction screening; (2) Announcement date is between 1/1/2010-
12/31/2015; (3) Geographic locations of target/issuer in China main land; (4) target market capitalization 
one day prior to the announcement date of M&A is greater than 0 (the purpose is to get only listed 
targets that have stock price information; (5) Transaction status is closed (completed). After that, 1378 
transactions are obtained. By applying several filters, deal details including cash offer, market to book 
ratio, transaction size, debt ratio, EBITDA ratio are obtained from the database. The deals that have 
missing information are excluded from the study. 
Target’s stock returns are collected from The China Stock Market & Accounting Research 
Database (CSMAR). Daily stock returns are used to conduct event studies, which help to generate 
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cumulative abnormal returns during a short-run period around the M&A announcement date. CSMAR 
database includes adjusted daily stock returns and also stock market returns from 2010 to 2015, which 
are important to conduct event studies using market model (one-factor model). After matching S&P 
Capital IQ M&As data and CSMAR stock data using ticker symbol, a sample is received, comprising 
683 deals that the targets are Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2015 and that have adequate 
information to conduct event studies and cross-sectional analysis.  
Figure 2: Total transaction value by years of announcement dates of Chinese mergers and acquisitions 
between 2010 to 2015. This figure summarizes the total transaction value of all Chinese M&As transaction 
each year between 2010-2015. The deal information is collected from S&P Capital IQ database.  
 
Consistent with PWC China report in 2015, the sample (described in details in Section 3) shows a 
significant growth in the number of deals and in the value of deals of M&A activities across years. 
Figure 1 shows that the number of transactions increase by 7.26 times from 2010 to 2015, and 2015 has 
the highest number of 256 deals. In addition, Figure 2 indicates that deal value increased approximately 
9.8 times from 2010 to 2015, reaching $267,774 million in 2015. 
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There are alternative explanations for the increasing number of mergers and acquisitions, especially 
in U.S. M&A market. For example, Mulherin (1996) show evidence that deregulation, oil price shocks, 
foreign competition, and financial innovations explain a significant portion of takeover activities in the 
1980s. Also, Kaplah (2000) show a general pattern of M&As, and conclude that most of the M&A 
activities are associated with technological or regulatory shocks.  
As concluded by China M&A market report (2015), on the one hand, there are severe problems that 
hinder companies to maintain competitiveness and to achieve internal growth such as excess capacity 
problems, policies restriction, economic structure reformation and environmental restrictions. On the 
other hand, compared with the increasing regulation of the Secondary Market, IPO Postponed Policies, 
the deregulation of M&As brings lucrative opportunities for M&A activities. The situation of Chinese 
M&A market is consistent with the abovementioned theories.  
15 industries (over almost 100 industries) that have the highest number of transactions during the 
period 2010-2015 are named. They are Agricultural products industry, Auto parts and equipment 
industry, Commodity chemicals industry, Construction machinery and heavy trucks industry, 
Department stores industry, Diversified real estate activities industry, Electrical components and 
equipment industry, Electronic components industry, Industrial machinery industry, Packaged foods and 
meats industry, Pharmaceuticals industry, Real estate development industry, Specialty chemicals, Steel 
industry, textiles industry. 
Figure 3 shows that Pharmaceuticals industry and Real estate development industry receives the 
highest number of bids (Chinese targets) during 2010 to 2015. The two following industries are 
Industrial machinery industry and Commodity chemicals industry that receive 32 and 31 bids 
respectively.  
There are some possible reasons for the increasing M&A activities in Chinese Pharmaceuticals 
industry.  Firstly, there are government factors that affect M&A activities in this industry. Qi (2014) and 
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Ma (2015) report that Government enhances monitoring such as tighten control over the approval of new 
drugs, Release of new Code of Medical Device GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice for Drug) in 2015 
and government policy guidance towards M&A activities in Pharmaceuticals industry.  Secondly, 
because of growing net profit from growing customer demand and policy support from the government, 
the growth of M&A activities in Pharmaceuticals will continue to increase CFDA (2014). Thirdly, by 
acquiring companies with high R&D capabilities, bidding firms can increase their core competitiveness 
in a relatively short period. 
Figure 3: Distribution of total deal number by industry of the first 15th industries of Chinese mergers 
and acquisitions between 2010 to 2015. The figure summarizes the number of M&A deals that the target is 
Chinese firm by industry. Deal information is collected from S&P Capital IQ database. Only 15 industries 
that have the highest number of deals are included.  
 
Figure 3 also shows that Real estate development industry receives the highest number of bids. 
Some possible reasons for the increasing M&A activities in this industry are presented. Xu (2014) state 
that because of the increasing competition in Real estate industry and the rising government monitoring, 
companies have to keep improving their core competitiveness, scale of economics and cost leadership. 
And the best way to reach the achievement is by doing mergers and acquisitions. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This tables shows the summary statistics of 683 Chinese mergers and acquisitions announced during 
the period 2010-2015. CARs are cumulative abnormal returns between the period from day -1 to day +1, 
given 0 is the announcement date. Cash dummy equals to 1 if the offer is financed 100% by cash, 0 otherwise. 
Transaction size is described as the total amount paid by the acquiring firm. Deal size is denoted as the natural 
logarithm of the transaction size. Market-to-book (Market value/Book value) is denoted as the market value 
of firm divided by its book value. Debt ratio equals to the ratio of total debt to total assets. EBITDA is 
denoted as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. 
 
Mean Standard deviation Median 
CARs 0.0198 0.0766 0.0075 
Size 6.8664 0.8909 6.7378 
Market-to-book ratio 3.3655 3.0082 2.4453 
Debt ratio 0.4683 0.2329 0.4513 
Cash dummy 0.3031 0.4599 0 
EBITDA ratio 0.0575 0.0578 0.0552 
Number of observations 683 
  Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 1. The average abnormal returns over the 
period (-1, +1) are 2% for target shareholders from 2010 to 2015. The average natural logarithm of deal 
size is 6.8 with a relatively small standard deviation of 0.9. Market-to-book ratio has average value of 
3.4 with standard deviation of 3, which indicates a relatively high fluctuation of the market-to-book ratio. 
The average debt ratio for all target firms during 2010 to 2015 is 46.8%. It shows that the Chinese target 
firms have assets more than twice as many as liabilities on average. The 46.8% debt ratio can be 
considered as that the Chinese targets are quite safe on average. The method of payment during 2010-
2015 shows that 30.3% of all transactions is financed by 100% cash, and the remaining 69.7% of deals is 
financed by stock and other offers. The average EBITDA ratio is 5.7% for 683 targets during 2010-2015, 
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and the standard deviation of EBITDA ratio is 0.058. The median is 5.5%, which is approximately 5.7%. 
The EBITDA ratio means that the target firms use their total assets to generate an average 5.7% of 
EBITDA profits.  
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Applications of event study in M&A context 
Event study methodology is used to measure the stock market reactions to the announcement of an 
M&A transaction under the assumption of efficient market. It helps to forecast whether the M&A 
transaction is profitable given that the capital market is efficient. Duso et al., (2010) show that the ex-
ante stock market performance is significantly correlated with the firm’s post-merger performance.  
In addition, M&A advisors can use event study as a supplement for the traditional valuation 
analysis. Specifically, the traditional method concentrates on the valuation multiples such as EPS of 
similar transactions while using event study method, analysts can use stock market reactions to the 
similar transactions and compare with the reaction to the current deal in order to have a better 
understanding about the forecast accuracy and quality of the current deal. Using the understanding from 
the perspective of capital market can assist communication between management teams of the target and 
the acquirer as well as helping them to do better decision-making (e.g., bidding strategy, selling strategy).  
Even study can also be a useful tool for competitor analysis. it helps managers to capture the impact 
of competitor’s strategic decisions (such as M&As) on their own firms from perspectives of the stock 
market. Specifically, M&As of the rival have impact on the whole stock market including the company. 
Therefore, by utilizing the event study method, the company can observe its stock reactions towards the 
rival’s movements (M&As).  Therefore, the event study method helps the company to capture how 
sensitive of its stock towards the the rival’s movements and also helps the company to recognize the 
main competitor from perspectives of capital market. 
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By utilizing event study method, previous studies show that the abnormal returns of the target are 
normally positive around the announcement date in most countries.  Merger rumours are frequently 
appeared on media, there speculators can speculate the probability that the deal actually happens and 
generate a significant positive return by just purchasing the targets stocks right after the rumours.  
In addition, cross-sectional analysis of CARs tells which industry area, deal type and target 
characters are going to give high positive returns. It provides guidelines for risk takers when they make 
their speculation decisions. For example, In the case of Chinese M&As, the study suggests that investing 
in potential targets in real estate development industry generates the highest returns on average. Tuccille 
(2003) writes completed guides for betting against takeover rumours “How to Profit from the Wall Street 
Mergers: Riding the Takeover Wave”. Furthermore, the study suggests that target characteristic such as 
100% cash offer and high market to book ratio are related to higher returns. This also provides investors 
or speculators with guidelines to make investment decisions in Chinese M&A market. 
3.2.2 Event study methodology 
Event study is the most statistically reliable method to measure the impact of a specific event on the 
value of a firm (Shah and Arora, 2014; Hauswald, 2002; Jianyu, José ,Chu, 2009). The reason why event 
study is effective is based on the assumption that the capital market is efficient and rational with respect 
to public information. The stock price is expected to respond immediately to any merger announcement. 
Therefore, the impact of an event such as mergers and acquisition can be caught over a relatively short 
time period. The length of event window is discussed in previous literatures. Hillmer and Yu (1979) 
state that the event window should finish within hours of the M&A announcement. Chang, Chen (1989) 
suggest that the event window should cover a couple of days. However, MacKinlay (1997) find that the 
accuracy of the results will be lower if more days are included in the event window because of 
confounding effects. 
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In this study, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are used to measure takeover returns for 
shareholders of Chinese listed target firms. Cumulative abnormal returns are examined by using the 
market model. If CARs significantly different from zero, then M&As create positive wealth effects for 
shareholders of Chinese target firms. If CARs are not significantly different from zero, then M&As do 
not create wealth effects for shareholders of Chinese target firms.  
The flow of conducing an event study is described as follows: 
The first step is to identify the event and the event window during which the abnormal returns are 
calculated to measure the effects of the event. For example, in this study, the event is denoted as M&A 
announcement and the event window includes a three-day period that is from day -1 to day +1, given 
that day 0 is the M&A announcement date. Normally, one day prior to the event and one day after the 
event will be included in the event window in practice. However, the longer the event window the lower 
the predictive power of the event study because of potential confounding effects from other market 
events. 
After the definition of the event and the event window, it is necessary to define an estimated 
window. Normally, the period prior to the event window is used as estimated window. For example, in 
this study, the 252 trading day (approximately 1 year) is used as the estimated window which is from 
day -30 to day -282. And in general, a gap of 30 to 50 days is introduced to make sure that the expected 
return estimation is unaffected by the event. Hence, a gap from day -1 to day -30 is introduced in the 
study.  
It is important to identify the measure of abnormal return to assess the impact of an event. 
Abnormal return is measured as the difference between actual return and the expected return. The 
expected return is also defined as the normal return, in absence of the event (M&A). The market model, 
the constant mean return model and the CAPM model are three ways to modelling the expected returns. 
The market return model assumes there is a stable linear relation between the market return and the 
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security returns.  The constant mean return model is a very simple and restrictive model that assumes the 
expected return of a given security is constant over time. The CAPM model assumes that the expected 
return of a given security is a linear function its covariance with the return of the market portfolio. 
However, the CAPM model requires the risk-free return which is difficult to obtain in developing 
countries. Therefore, this study chooses to use market model instead of the constant mean return model 
and the CAPM model to modelling expected returns.  
Market model is a statistical model that based on the assumption of a constant and linear relation 
between the market return and the return of any given security. For security 𝑖 the market model is  
𝑅#$ = 𝛼# + 𝛽#𝑅)$ + 𝜀#$                         (1) 
Where 
 𝑡 refers to the time index which is from (-282, -30); 𝑖 refers to any security in the sample; 𝑅#$ 
stands for returns on security 𝑖; 𝑅)$ stands for the market return; 𝜀#$	is the error term for security 𝑖.  
Equation (1) is estimated over the estimated window from day -282 to day -30 in the study. From 
that we receive predicted 𝛼# and 𝛽# for the estimation of expected returns in Equation (2).  
Expected return, also referred to normal return, is the return given the absence of the event (M&A). 
Expected returns are estimated during the (-1, +1) three-day event window. 
𝐸𝑅# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅)$  (2) 
Where 
𝑡 refers to the time index which is from (-1, +1); 𝐸𝑅# stands for expected return for company 𝑖 in 
day 𝑡 . 	𝛼  and 𝛽  are parameters from the regression of security 𝑖  from Equation (1) where 𝛼  is the 
intercept; 𝛽	is the coefficient of the independent. Then the abnormal return 𝐴𝑅#$  is calculated by the 
Equation (3) as follows:  
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Abnormal return denotes the difference between actual return (which we can observe from the 
stock price) and expected return (normal return given the absence of the M&A). 
𝐴𝑅#$ = 𝑅#$ − (𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅)$)  (3) 
Where 
	𝐴𝑅#$ refers to the abnormal return of firm 𝑖 in day 𝑡.  
And daily abnormal returns are summed over the three-day event window, (-1, +1), to calculate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as from Equation (4) as followed.                               
𝐶𝐴𝑅#(34,4) = 𝐴𝑅34 + 𝐴𝑅6 + 𝐴𝑅74  (4) 
Where: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅# refers to cumulative abnormal return during the three-day event window; 	𝐴𝑅34 refers to abnormal return in day -1; 𝐴𝑅6 refers to abnormal return in day 0;   𝐴𝑅74 refers to abnormal return in day +1. 
Our interest is answering the question whether M&As create wealth to the shareholder of Chinese 
targets on average. This study therefore averages the cumulative abnormal returns of 683 deals to 
evaluate whether the mean CARs are negative or positive.  
3.2.3 Linear Regression  
Linear regression is the most widely used econometric methodology. It studies the linear 
relationships between variable 𝑌  which denotes the dependent variable and explanatory variables 𝑋 
which is a set of independent variables. Regression of variable 𝑌 on variables 𝑋 tells us the effect of 
each element of 𝑋 on 𝑌 given that all other factors are unchanged.   
 26 
The typical model is: 
𝑌 = 𝑏6 + 𝑏4𝑥4 + 𝑏4𝑥< + ⋯+ 𝜀 (5) 
This study regresses Cumulative abnormal returns on potential determinants such as deal size, 
market-to-book ratio, EBITDA ratio, and so on. The model to be examined is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝛾6 + 𝛾4𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛾<𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑡𝑜	𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	 + 𝛾G𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡	 + 𝛾I𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝛾L𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑎 + 𝜀 (6), 
where CAR is cumulative abnormal return between day -1 and day 1, given 0 is the M&A 
announcement date (𝐶𝐴𝑅 = 𝐴𝑅34 + 𝐴𝑅6 + 𝐴𝑅4). Cash dummy equals one if the offer is financed 100% 
by cash, zero otherwise. Deal size is denoted as the natural logarithm of the transaction size where 
transaction size is described as the total amount paid by the acquiring firm, (Deal size = log (Transaction 
size)). Market-to-book ratio is denoted as the market value of firm divided by book value of the firm.  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑡𝑜	𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 = 	𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦	 + 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑠𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘	𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒	𝑜𝑓	𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑠 		 
Debt ratio is defined as the proportion of a company’s assets that are financed by debts. It is equal 
to the ratio of total debts to total assets. (Equation: Debt ratio=Total debts/Total assets). EBITDA ratio is 
denoted as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. 
(EBITDA ratio=EBITDA/Total assets). 
4. Empirical results and interpretations 
4.1   Cumulative abnormal returns 
As from Table 1, the average takeover returns of Chinese targets are 2% over a short period of three 
days around the announcement date, (-1, +1), between 2010 and 2015. This result shows that comparing 
to the whole capital market, the shareholders of target firms gain 2% increase of stocks returns. In 2011, 
Takeover returns for shareholders of Chinese target firms is 1.5 %. And average CARs in 2015 is more 
than 4.1%. 
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Method to generate cumulative abnormal returns is from the perspective of event study as 
mentioned in the methodology part. Event study is used to examine the cumulative abnormal returns of 
an individual firm. Therefore, the study introduces the way to calculate cumulative abnormal returns for 
683 Chinese listed target firms as follows. 
• How to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for 683 firms?  
Firstly, we calculate the difference between each trading date and announcement date for each firm. 
Then the difference of M&A announcement date and the trading date is equal to 0, which is denoted as 
day 0. Secondly, the differences between trading dates and announcement dates for each firm are 
collected. Differences that are earlier than day 0 are denoted as day -1, day -2, …; differences that are 
latter than day 0 are denoted as day +1, day +2, ….  Thirdly, differences that are larger than 1 and 
smaller than day -282 from all data are excluded. Then the study sets the estimation window which is 
from day -282 to day -30. A gap is set from day -30 to day -1. Event window is calculated from day -1 to 
day +1. Finally, the study generates cumulative abnormal returns over period (-1, +1) for all companies. 
• How to arrange companies and obtain average CARs across industries? 
Companies classified in different groups are based on industry characteristics of the target’s core 
business. Subsequently, the study computes the average CARs for each industry group. 
• How to arrange companies and obtain average CARs across years? 
Because CARs for all companies are available, the study groups companies that have M&A 
announcement date in the same year, then calculates the average cumulative abnormal returns for each 
year. 
 
 
 28 
Figure 4: Average cumulative abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese listed target firms across 
years from 2010 to 2015. This figure shows the percentage of CARs on average for each year during the 
period 2010- 2015. CARs are generated by summing up abnormal returns over the period (-1, +1), given day 
0 is the announcement date. Abnormal returns are computed by subtracting expected returns from actual 
returns. Expected returns are estimated by using the market model.  
 
 
Figure 5: Average cumulative abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese listed target firms across 
industries from 2010 to 2015. This figure shows the percentage of CARs on average for each industry during 
the period 2010-2015. CARs are generated by summing up abnormal returns over the period (-1, +1), given 
day 0 is the announcement date. Abnormal returns are computed by subtracting expected returns from actual 
returns. Expected returns are estimated by using the market model.  
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Figure 4 show that the average CARs in year 2015 are 4.1%, which indicates that year 2015 is a 
good year for shareholders of Chinese listed target firms because target firms in 2015 received the 
highest cumulative abnormal returns compared with other years. 
Figure 5 shows that diversified real estate activities industry has achieved the highest mean CARs, 
which up to 7.5%. Followed is the department stores industry, which achieved 4.9 % of average CARs. 
The third is real estate development industry, which achieved around 3.7 % of average CARs. These 
results show that shareholders of Chinese listed target firms in diversified real estate industry received 
the highest returns compared with returns in other industries. 
Figure 6: Average cumulative abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese listed target firms across 
industries in 2015. This figure shows the percentage of average CARs for each industry in 2015. CARs 
are generated by summing up the abnormal returns over the period (-1, +1), given day 0 is the announcement 
date. Abnormal returns are computed by subtracting expected returns from actual returns. Expected returns 
are estimated by using the market model. 
 
Figure 6 indicates that in 2015, shareholders of Chinese listed targets in diversified real estate 
activities industry received the highest abnormal returns that are 9.4% during the period (-1, +1) around 
the announcement date. The result of CARs in 2015 is consistent with the result during 2010-2015 that 
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both of them show that diversified real estate activities industry create most value for shareholders of 
Chinese targets compared with other industries. 
Shareholders of Chinese targets in Real estate development industry receive 7.3% of average CARs 
in 2015, compared to 3.7% of CARs for the period 2010-2015. The results imply that real estate 
development industry creates wealth for shareholders of Chinese targets in these five years, especially 
much wealth for shareholders in 2015.  
Shareholders of Chinese targets in electronic components industry received -0.4% of average CARs 
during 2010-2015, and -2.5% of average CARs in 2015. Consequently, the results show that M&As in 
electronic components industry do not create wealth for shareholders of Chinese listed targets. 
Average CARs of shareholders of Chinese targets in department stores industry are 4.9% during 
2010-2015, and 7.0% in 2015. The results reveal that Chinese target’s shareholders in department stores 
industry are rewarded from mergers and acquisitions from 2010-2015, especially in 2015.  
Figure 4, 5, and 6 suggests that on overall shareholders of Chinese targets receive positive wealth 
from bidders bidding for their shares. These findings are strongly consistent with results that researchers 
find in the U.S. market, although the magnitude of the effect is much lower. There are several 
hypotheses explaining the wealth gain of the target’s shareholders. Firstly, the wealth gain may partially 
reflect the synergistic value that the acquirer expects to receive through combining and applying cost 
optimization, improving their core competitiveness, scale of economics and cost leadership. It is noticed 
that the market rationally reflects the expected synergy into stock price of the target, but the acquirer 
needs to exploit these gains after the merger of the two firms in the future. Secondly, the wealth gain of 
the target’s shareholders may be the realisation by stock market investors that the target’s stock price is 
previously undervalued, and the M&A announcement make them re-evaluate the target’s stock price. As 
a result, it forces the stock price of the target increases. Thirdly, the takeover returns can be results of a 
restructuring of the target as a separate operational entity which may still share managerial, financial and 
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strategic synergies with the acquirer. Lastly,  the wealth gain of the target shareholders may be because 
of the acquirer’s overpayment. Behavioural economists suggests that managers of the acquiring firms 
suffer from hubris (Roll, 1986) or overconfidence (Sudarsanam & Gao, 2004; Malmendier and Tate, 
2005) may overestimate the value of the target because believe that they “work miracles” and gain from 
acquiring the target. In this special view, the wealth gain of the target is the wealth of the acquirer. Or in 
order words, the acquirer overbids and transfer wealth to the shareholders of the target.  Researchers find 
evidence supporting this view.  Roll (1986) shows that the target’s shareholders receive more premium 
when the acquirer is “hubris-infected”. Malmendier and Tate (2008) similarly find a causal relation 
between managerial overconfidence and overpayment, and it leads to value-destroying acquisitions. Due 
to the complexity of these alternative these, future research needs to separate or differentiate them to 
figure out what really matters to the gain of the target’s shareholders. 
4.2 Cross-sectional analysis 
The p-value of 0.01 indicates that the null hypothesis is being rejected from the levels as low as 1% 
of significance level. The p-value of 0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis is being rejected from the 
levels as low as 5% of significance level. The p-value of 0.1 indicates that the null hypothesis is being 
rejected from the levels as low as 10% of significance level. 
Table 2 shows that market-to-book ratio and cash dummy are statistically significant at 5% level. 
Specifically, market-to-book ratio increases 1, CARs increase 0.2%, significantly at 5% level, holding 
all other factors constant. This indicates that shareholders of Chinese listed targets receive more 
abnormal returns when the target firms having higher internal investment opportunities. Every 1% 
increase of investment opportunities brings 0.002% increases in abnormal returns for shareholders of 
Chinese targets.  
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that M&As force target firms to make better use of 
their cash flow and thus benefit the shareholders and therefore high market-to-book reflects good news 
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to shareholders of targets. Specifically, bidders who are lack of valuable investment opportunities tend to 
seek external investment opportunities by doing M&As to achieve future growth. However, 
managements of target firms having high internal investment opportunities may tend to do more 
investments which are possibly unprofitable investments instead of paying dividends back to their 
shareholders. 
Table 2: Cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns on determinants during 2010-2015. 
Table 2 shows the result of cross-sectional analysis of CARs for shareholders of Chinese target firms during 
the period 2010-2015. CARs are cumulative abnormal returns over the period (-1, +1), given day 0 is the 
announcement date. Deal size is denoted as the natural logarithm of the transaction size. Transaction size is 
described as the total amount paid by the acquiring firm. Market-to-book ratio (Market value/Book value) is 
denoted as the market value of firm divided by its book value. Debt ratio equals to the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Cash dummy equals to 1 if the offer is financed 100% by cash, 0 otherwise. EBITDA ratio is 
denoted as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. ***, **, * 
indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Dependent variable:  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
 Coefficient Standard errors 
Size 0.002 0.004 
Market-to-book ratio 0.002** 0.001 
Debt ratio 0.011 0.013 
Cash dummy 0.014** 0.006 
EBITDA ratio -0.074 0.055 
Constant -0.004 0.023 
N 683  
R-sq 0.017  
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 In addition, Table 2 shows that when the deal is financed entirely by cash, CARs increase 1.4%, 
significantly at 5% level, holding all other factors constant. It means that a deal that is paid in cash 100% 
has average CARs 1.4% larger than stock offers & other offers, holding other factors remain constant. 
Hence, it shows that mergers with 100% cash offer create more value compared with stock offer or other 
offers for shareholders of Chinese listed target firms. 
The finding is consistent with theories stating that targets with cash offers earn a significant higher 
return compare with those involved in stock transactions. There are two alternative hypotheses 
associated with cash payment. One is tax hypothesis. Wansley et al. (1983) and Yen-sheng and Ralph 
(1987) argue that if targets shareholders sell their shares in stock exchange offers, they can delay the tax 
payment for capital gains until they sell bidding firm’s shares. However, they have to pay capital gain 
taxes immediately if they receive cash offer. Hence, target shareholders expect higher returns to 
compensate their immediate taxes payments in cash offers. The other hypothesis is information effect 
hypothesis. Fishman (1989) argues that cash offer is a signal of a high valuation of the target, aiming at 
preventing potential competitors. Elazar and Narayanan (1990) add that cash offer refers to good news 
about potential synergy, resulting in higher returns to shareholders of targets compared to stock offers. It 
is also consistent with previous finding. Specifically, Gregor et al. (2001) indicates that target firm 
shareholders receive 20% abnormal returns for 100% cash-financed mergers compared with 13% 
abnormal returns for 100% stock-financed mergers.  
As we know, shareholders or investors are always interested in factors directly contributing to 
wealth creation of stocks. Therefore, to further investigate what contributes to positive abnormal returns 
for target shareholders, the study analyses the effects of determinants on the group of transactions that 
generate positive takeover returns. The author divides the sample into two groups, one includes 301 
transactions generating negative cumulative abnormal returns, the other comprises 382 transactions 
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creating positive wealth for target shareholders. The author then conducts cross-sectional analysis of 
CARs for the latter group using a similar set of determinants as specified in Equation 6.  
Table 3: Cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns for the sample of targets having 
positive CARs. This table shows the regression analysis of positive CARs of Chinese targets during the 
period 2010-2015. CARs are cumulative abnormal returns over the period (-1, +1), given day 0 is the 
announcement date. Deal size is denoted as the natural logarithm of the transaction size. Transaction size is 
described as the total amount paid by the acquiring firm. Market-to-book ratio (Market value/Book value) is 
denoted as the market value of firm divided by its book value. Debt ratio equals to the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. Cash dummy equals to 1 if the offer is financed 100% by cash, 0 otherwise. EBITDA ratio is 
denoted as the earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. ***, **, * 
indicate the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable:  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
 
Coefficient Standard errors 
Size 0.007 * 0.004 
Market-to-book ratio 0.004 *** 0.001 
Debt ratio 0.001 0.015 
Cash dummy 0.007 0.007 
EBITDA ratio -0.126 ** 0.06 
Constant  0.011 0.027 
N 382 
 R-sq 0.048 
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Table 3 shows that deal size is significant at 10 % level. Market-to-book ratio is significant at 1% 
level and that EBIDA is significant at 5 % level. As can be seen, deal size increases 1%, CARs increase 
0.007% and it is statistically significantly at 10%, holding other factors remain constant. It means that 
every 1% increase in the natural logarithm of total amount paid by the acquiring firm result in 0.007% 
increase in CARs for shareholders of Chinese targets. It is noticed that size variable is not significant in 
the whole group of 683 samples, but is significant in the group of 382 firms generating positive CARs. 
In addition, market-to-book ratio increases every 1%, CARs increase 0.004%, statistically 
significant at 1% level, holding other factors remain constant.  It can be explained that the higher the 
market-to-book ratio, the higher expectation the market towards the investment opportunities of the firm. 
Also, compared with the whole sample of 683 deals, market-to-book is more significant in the positive 
CARs group comprising 382 deals. 
Interestingly, for the sample of positive CARs, the study finds that EBITDA is negative and 
statistically significant. Specifically, EBITDA increase 1%, CARs reduce by 0.126%, holding other 
factors constant. The EBITDA ratio is the measure of the amount of EBITDA profit generated on the 
company’s total assets. The result implies that the more profitable the company, the little value creation 
for shareholders of Chinese target firms if selling the company. Namely, target shareholders will receive 
more value keeping their share instead of selling. The market doesn’t expect profitable companies to be 
acquired. 
5. Conclusion and acknowledgment  
5.1 Conclusion  
Investors and shareholders seek to profit by generating higher returns from stock investment. This 
study examines cumulative abnormal returns and factors influencing cumulative abnormal returns for 
shareholders of Chinese listed target firms. By utilizing event study method and linear regression method, 
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the study obtain results for 683 Chinese listed target firms. The results show that takeover returns for 
shareholders of Chinese target firms around the announcement date is 2% on average over (-1, +1) three-
day event window from 2010 to 2015. This means comparing to the whole capital market, the 
shareholders of Chinese targets gain 2% increases of stocks returns.  
However, the abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese target firms are lower compared with 
that of U.S. (Shah & Arora. 2014). For example, Gregor et al. (2001) conclude that the average abnormal 
returns over (-1, +1) three-day event window for target firm shareholders are 16%, significantly at 1 % 
level for companies from 1973 to 1998. Mulherin, Boone (2000) conclude an average abnormal returns 
of 18.4% during the (-1, +1) event window around the M&A announcement date by utilizing a sample 
comprising 376 targets from 1990 to 1998. Ruback and Jensen (1983) show that shareholders of targets 
receive abnormal returns of 20%~30% surrounding the date of M&A announcement by summarizing 13 
empirical studies from 1956 to 1983.  Michael and Richard (1983), and Gregg et al. (1988) show that 
abnormal returns around announcement period for shareholders of the target firms are around 20%. To 
the author’s knowledge, government ownership of bidding firms, government intervention in M&A 
activities and lack of competitors in Chinese M&A market could be possible reasons for the low positive 
abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese target firms. 
The study also shows that average CARs in year 2015 is 4.14%, which are the highest compared 
with other years. This means that year 2015 is a good year for shareholders of Chinese target firms. 
Summary of average CARs in 15 industries with the highest number of deals shows that M&A activities 
in diversified real estate activities Industry have achieved the highest average CARs for target 
shareholders during 2010-2015. Meanwhile the result of CARs by industry in 2015 further confirms that 
M&A activities in real estate activities industry created substantial wealth for shareholders of Chinese 
targets. Moreover, M&As also created value for Chinese target shareholders of real estate development 
industry. In brief, M&As in real estate related industry positively influence the wealth of Chinese target 
shareholders on average. In department stores industry, an average of 4.9% positive takeover returns 
 37 
during 2010-2015 and an average of 7.0% of CARs in 2015 indicate that M&As of department stores 
industry do create wealth for Chinese target shareholders. Negative cumulative abnormal returns 
generated from M&As in electronic components industry during 2010-2015 and in 2015 show that target 
shareholders in this industry do not gain benefit from M&As on average.   
On overall, empirical evidence shows that the target’s shareholders receive positive wealth during a 
short period of three days around the announcement date. This finding is strongly consistent with 
evidence found in the U.S. market. And there are alternative hypotheses explaining the wealth gain of 
the target. Firstly, it may partially reflect the synergistic value that the acquirer expects to receive 
through combining the two firms.  Secondly, it may be the realisation by stock market investors that the 
target’s stock price is previously undervalued, and the M&A announcement make them re-evaluate the 
target’s stock price. Thirdly, the takeover returns can be results of a restructuring of the target as a 
separate operational entity which may still share managerial, financial and strategic synergies with the 
acquirer. Lastly, the wealth gain of the target shareholders may be because of the acquirer’s 
overpayment.  
The regression results of determinants on cumulative abnormal returns show that cash offers and 
market-to-book ratios are significant determinants for takeover returns of Chinese target shareholders. 
Market-to-book ratio increases 1%, CARs increase 0.002%, significantly at 5% level. This indicates that 
shareholders of Chinese targets receive more abnormal returns when the target firms having higher 
internal investment opportunities. Every 1% increase of investment opportunities brings 0.002% 
increases in abnormal returns for shareholders of Chinese targets.  
In addition, 100% cash offers generate average abnormal returns of 1.4%. This result shows that 
mergers with 100% cash offer create more value compared with stock offers or other offers for 
shareholders of Chinese target firms. The result is consistent with previous studies in U.S. show that 
cash offers are related with higher takeover returns for target firms. Myers, Majluf, (1984) stock offer is 
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recognized negatively by the stock market. Franks, harris, mayer (1988), V.K. Narayanan(1992)  targets 
earn higher returns from cash offers based on taxes hypothesis. 
EBIDA is also identified as a determinant of target returns; however, its effect is more pronounced 
in the sample of targets that have positive CARs. Empirical evidence suggests that increase 1% in the 
profitability of the target will result in 0.126% loss in the wealth of the shareholders. It suggests that 
selling profitable targets cause harm to shareholders. Deal size is also significant in the sample of 
positive CARs, but its economic effect is not so significant.  
5.2 Implications of the finding 
The study shows the takeover returns of Chinese target shareholders around the M&A 
announcement date and determinants of takeover returns for shareholders of Chinese target firms.  
In practice, firstly, the results strongly suggest that it is good to be M&A targets in real estate 
activities industry because target shareholders receive the highest benefits on average. And it is not good 
to be M&A targets in electronic Components industry because the results show that targets failed to 
generate wealth for shareholders from being acquired.  
Secondly, the findings about determinants highlight that managers of target firms should be 
perceptive to those factors influencing wealth gains of shareholders such as payment method, market to 
book ratio, debt ratio and so on. Importantly, managers of target firms can make the best use of those 
determinants to maximize wealth creation for shareholders such as negotiating for 100% cash offers and 
so on.   
Thirdly, the study gives suggestions to individual investors who are interested in Chinese M&A 
market. They should be sensitive to capture abnormal returns in different industries to avoid possible 
risk and at the same time observe those factors affecting stock returns. 
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5.3 Acknowledgement 
Three-day event window of event study methodology has been widely used in practice to assess the 
abnormal returns of shareholders during the occurrence of mergers and acquisitions. A relatively short-
horizon event window such as one-day or three-day period increases the probabilities to control 
confounding effect from other market events. Conversely, by employing long-horizon event windows 
such as 5-days, 11- days, we can examine the sensitivity of the results and also observe the future trend 
of the takeover returns. 
  In addition, the study only controls for a very limited set of factors in the cross-section analysis of 
targets due to the limited availability of information. For example, the governance factors which 
reflecting the governance quality of the targets firms should also be examined in the cross-sectional 
study (e.g., ratio of independent directors, takeover provisions, and so on). 
One more interesting area for the future research of Chinese M&As is to examine the wealth 
created by both targets and acquirers. It is well-known that M&As are made to create synergy. Since Chi 
et al. (2011) mainly study the wealth effects of the Chinese listed acquiring firms, and this study 
examines the wealth effects on the Chinese listed targets, therefore, by well utilizing cross-sectional 
studies, it should be interesting to look at the total CARs created by both targets and acquirers in a short-
run period around the announcement date.    
In section 4.1, the study shows several hypotheses that can explain the wealth gain of the target’s 
shareholders that are empirically tested by using U.S. data. However, none of these tests is conducted 
using Chinese data because there were little data about Chinese listed targets at that time. Due to the 
availability of well-computerized dataset nowadays, it is important to re-evaluate the target’s returns and 
differentiate between the effect of the target’s re-valuation and managerial hubris. Answering these 
questions are possible and it leaves a promising area for future research.  
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